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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have demonstrated thatmachine learning approaches
like deep neural networks (DNNs) are easily fooled by adversarial
attacks. Subtle and imperceptible perturbations of the data are able
to change the result of deep neural networks. Leveraging vulner-
able machine learning methods raises many concerns especially
in domains where security is an important factor. Therefore, it is
crucial to design defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks.
For the task of image classification, unnoticeable perturbations
mostly occur in the high-frequency spectrum of the image. In this
paper, we utilize tensor decomposition techniques as a preprocess-
ing step to find a low-rank approximation of images which can
significantly discard high-frequency perturbations. Recently a de-
fense framework called Shield [3] could “vaccinate" Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN) against adversarial examples by perform-
ing random-quality JPEG compressions on local patches of images
on the ImageNet dataset. Our tensor-based defense mechanism
outperforms the SLQ method from Shield by 14% against Fast
Gradient Descent (FGSM) adversarial attacks, while maintaining
comparable speed.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last few year, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been
tremendously popular in a various domains including image pro-
cessing and computer vision. However, recently, the robustness of
DNNs has been questioned when facing adversarial inputs. The per-
formance of DNNs can significantly drop even on slightly perturbed
instances [15]. For the task of image classification, attackers put
constraints on perturbations such that they remain unnoticeable
to the human eye, but they are still able to greatly deteriorate the
performance of the model.
Utilizing machine learning methods which are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks in system where safety and security are critical
factors may cause serious problems. Therefore, it is crucial to have
a robust model against adversaries, especially in security-sensitive
domains like autonomous driving and medical imaging. To address
this concern, recent studies have conducted research to analyze
vulnerability of deep learning methods in order to come up with
defense techniques against the adversarial attacks [1, 3, 10, 14].
To measure the strength of a perturbation, usually an l2 or l∞
norm is used. Adversarial perturbations are mostly designed so that
they have a small norm and are unnoticeable to human inspection.
Designing a defense mechanism is a difficult task. Typically, the
defender has only access to the perturbed instances (and definitely
not the original ones, where there would be hope to identify which
parts have been tampered with) and should be able to defend against
different types of perturbations. Moreover, a defense mechanism
which specialized on a particular kind of attack could be easily
Figure 1: System Overview: low-rank tensor approximation of im-
ages to “vaccinate" the network against perturbations. (the term
“vaccinate” was first used by Das et al. [3] to refer to models
equipped with a defense mechanism.)
defeated by new attacks which are optimized against its strategy.
Therefore, designing a defense techniquewhich captures a universal
pattern across various attacks is highly desirable, since this will
able to defend against most of the adversarial attacks.
Shield proposed by Das et al. [3], is a real-time defense frame-
work which performs JPEG compression with random levels over
local patches of images to eliminate unnoticeable perturbations
which mostly appear in high frequency spectrum of images. In this
paper, we propose a tensor decomposition approach to compute
a low-rank approximation of images which significantly discards
high-rank perturbations. However, Shield considers images in iso-
lation and does not pay attention to the correlation of images when
facing adversarial attacks.
Our contributions are as follows:
• Defense through the lens of factorization: We propose
a novel defense against adversarial attacks on images which
utilizes tensor decomposition to reconstruct a low-approximation
of perturbed images before feeding them to the deep net-
work for classification. Without any retraining of the model,
our method can significantly mitigate adversarial attacks.
• Efficient and effectivemethod: Representing images with
tensor, allows processing images in batches as 4-mode tensor,
which is able to capture latent structure of perturbations
from multiple images rather than a single image which leads
to more performance improvements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
related work. We introduce our proposed method in Section 3 and
provide experimental results in Section 4. Finally, in section 5 we
offer conclusions and discuss future works.
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2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
In this paper, we focus on defending against adversarial attacks on
deep learning methods for the task of image classification. Here,
we briefly outline some of the most popular adversarial attacks on
images.
Given a classifierC , the goal of an adversarial attack is to modify
an instance x to a perturbed instance x ′ such that C(x) , C(x ′),
while keeping the distance ∥x − x ′∥ between perturbed and clean
instance small. By ∥.∥ we deonte some norm which is also used to
express the strength of the perturbations. The popular choices are
Euclidean distance (l2 norm) and Chebyshev distance (l∞ norm).
Here, we discuss some of the popular attacks, against which we
evaluate our proposed method.
Fast Gradient SignMethod (FGSM)[5]: FGSM is a fast method
to compute perturbations which is based on computing first-order
gradients. FGSM generates adversarial images by introducing a
perturbation as follows:
x ′ = x + ϵ .siдn(∇Jx (θ ,x ,y)) (1)
where ϵ is a user-defined threshold that determines the strength
of the perturbations and controls the magnitude of perturbations
per pixel. θ is the parameter of the model, y is the true label of the
instance x , and J is the cost of training the neural network.
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM)[8]: I-FGSM
is the iterative version of the FGSM. In each iteration i , I-FGSM
clips the pixel values to remain within the l∞ neighborhood of the
corresponding values from a “clean” instance x :
x ′i = x
′
i−1 + α .siдn(∇Jx ′i−1 (θ ,x
′
i−1,y)) (2)
ProjectedGradientDescent (PGD)[9]: PGD is one of the strongest
gradient-based attacks [9] Given a clean image x , PGD aims to find
a small perturbation δ ∈ S to generate the perturbed instance
x ′ = x + δ . PGD starts from a random perturbation and iteratively
updates the perturbation:
δi = ΠS[δi−1 + τsiдn(∇xL(x + δi−1,y))] (3)
where τ is a fixed step size. ΠS projects the perturbation onto set
S, set of allowed perturbation in the ϵ neighborhood the “clean"
instance x .
2.2 Defense Against Adversarial Attacks
Shield proposed by Das et al. [3], uses image preprocessing as a
defense mechanism to reduce the effect of perturbations. Shield is
based on the observation that the attacks described above are high-
frequency, thus, eliminating those high frequencies (which are not
generally visible by the human eye) will sanitize the image. Shield
performs Stochastic Local Quantization (SLQ) as a preprocessing
step and subsequently employs JPEG compression with qualities
20, 40, 60, and 80 on the image, then for each 8 × 8 block of the
image, randomly selects from one of the compressed images. Shield
also retrains the model on images compressed with different JPEG
qualities and uses an ensemble of these models to defends against
adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we preprocess images using tensor decomposi-
tion techniques to achieve a low-rank approximation of the image.
We can significantly alleviate the effect of perturbations without
performing any retraining. In a parallel approach [4] employs sin-
gular value decomposition to compute a low-rank approximation
of graph to defend against adversarial attacks on graphs. How-
ever, this paper is the first to identify and leverage the observation
that gradient-based attacks on deep learning image classifiers are
manifested in high-rank components of a decomposition of the
image.
3 PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we first investigate the characteristics of adversarial
attacks on networks designed for the task of image classification.
Then we propose a tensor-based defense mechanism against these
attacks which improves the performance of the network.
3.1 Characteristics of Image Perturbations
Assume a trained model C with a high accuracy on clean images
is given. Adversarial attacks perform perturbations on the clean
images in a way that they are imperceptible to humans, yet are
successful in deceiving the model to misclassify the perturbed in-
stances. In other words, for a clean image x and its corresponding
perturbed image x ′, the goal is to have:C(x) , C(x ′). The adversar-
ial attacks do not preserve the spectral characteristics of images and
add high frequency components to images to remain unnoticeable
to the human eyes [3]. Perturbations in image domain are crafted
in a way that mostly affect high frequency spectrum of images.
Therefore, discarding the high frequency factors of the image using
approaches like compression or low-rank approximation of images
could be successful defense mechanisms against these type of per-
turbations. Therefore, a mechanism that only keeps the low-rank
components of the image and discards the high-rank ones, can be
successful in discarding the perturbations. In [3], authors leverage
JPEG compression to remove high frequency components of the
image and alleviate the effect of perturbations. In this paper, we
study the problem from a “matrix spectrum” point of view (i.e., the
singular value profile and the intrinsic low-rank dimensionality
of the data) and use tensor decomposition techniques to achieve a
low-rank approximation of perturbed images.
3.2 Tensor-based Defense Mechanism
In this section, we briefly describe concepts and notations used in
the paper.
A tensor, denoted by X, is a multidimensional matrix. The order
of a tensor is the number of modes/ways and is the number of
indices required to index the tensor [12]. An RGB image is a three-
mode tensor where the first and second modes correspond to the
pixels and the third mode corresponds to the red, green, and blue
channels, i.e. the frontal slices are red, green, and blue channels
of the image. An RGB image of sizeW × H is a 3-mode tensor of
sizeW ×H × 3, whereW and H are width and height of the image,
respectively.
To achieve a low-rank approximation of the perturbed images,
we perform a tensor decomposition technique on the image and
by choosing small values for the rank of the tensor, we reconstruct
a low-rank approximation of the image which is fed to the deep
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Figure 2: Tensor-Train decomposition of a 4-mode tensor.
network. The low-rank approximation of image discards high fre-
quency perturbations which can improve the performance of the
network on the perturbed images. However, traditional tensor de-
composition techniques like CP/Parafac [6] and Tucker[16] are
time-consuming and may slow down the neural network perfor-
mance which makes our proposed method impractical for real-time
defense. To overcome this issue, we leverage Tensor-Train decom-
position [11] which scales linearly with respect to the dimension
of the tensor and was especially introduced to address the problem
of curse of dimensionality [11]. This highly-desirable property of
the Tensor-Train allows us to process images in batches which
form a 4-mode tensor and perform the Tensor-Train decomposi-
tion on 4-mode tensors quite fast. For a batch of N images, the
size of the 4-mode tensor will be N ×W × H × 3. Generally de-
composing a 4-mode tensor is slower compared to a 3-mode one,
however, by considering images in batches, some of the I/O over-
head is reduced which results in almost the same processing time
on the entire dataset. Furthermore, processing images in batches
improves the performance of the model. The reason behind this
is that decomposing images in batches, extracts latent structure
corresponding to perturbations from multiple images and captures
general characteristics of perturbations.
For a 4-mode tensor, the Tensor-Train decomposition can be
written as follows:
X(i, j,k, l) ≈
∑
r1,r2,r3
G1(i, r1)G2(r1, j, r2)G3(r2,k, r3)G4(r3, l) (4)
Figure 2 illustrates the Tensor-Train decomposition of a 4-mode
tensor.
Another possible representation for the batch of images is to
convert the 4-mode tensor to a 3-mode tensor by stacking the im-
ages along the third mode, i.e. stacking RGB channels and the result
tensor will be of dimensionW × H × 3 ∗ N . Figure 3 illustrates a 3-
mode stacked tensor of N images. There are other ways to convert
a 4-mode tensor into a 3-mode one. For instance, another way is
to flatten the RGB image into a matrix with three columns corre-
sponding to the channels of the image. With this representation,
the final tensor will be of sizeW ∗ H × 3 × N . One disadvantage of
this representation is that flattening the image ignores the spatial
Figure 3: Stacking 3-mode images along the third mode.
relationship of the pixels. Moreover, with this vectorized repre-
sentation, the first dimension is much bigger than the other two
dimensions and requires a larger value of rank to get a reasonable
approximation of the image, and larger ranks make the decomposi-
tion slower. For these reasons, we do not consider the vectorized
representation in our study. In the experimental evaluations that
follows, we will examine different representation including single
image versus batch of images and 3-mode tensors versus 4-mode
tensors.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we show how the proposed method can successfully
remove adversarial perturbations and we compare our results to
Shield (SLQ). According to [2], original Shield evaluations has
gained benefit from central cropping of images during evaluation,
whereas the perturbations were generated with cropping being off.
In all our evaluations, we disable the central cropping.
4.1 Experiment Setup
We performed experiments on the validation set of the ImageNet
dataset which includes 50,000 images from 1,000 classes. All experi-
ments are performed on the ResNet-v2 50 model from the TF-Slim
module of TensorFlow. The adversarial attacks are from the Clever-
Hans package 1 [13]. We performed the experiments on a machine
with one NVIDIA Titan Xp (12 GB) GPU. We used TensorLy 2
library in Python to perform tensor decomposition techniques [7].
4.2 Parameter Tuning
In our evaluations, we express different configurations in form of
a list as [tensor decomposition, tensor representation, batch size,
rank] and we investigate the accuracy and runtime of the ResNet-v2
50 on 1000 images from the ImageNet dataset for different configu-
rations. The possible values for each part of the configuration list
is as follows:
• Tensor decomposition: {Parafac, Tucker, Tensor-Train}
• Tensor representation: {3-mode, 3-mode-stacked, 4-mode}
• Batch size: {1, 5, 10, 20, 50}
• Rank: varies by choice of tensor representation and decom-
position.
Performing tensor decomposition for a batch of images can re-
duce the decomposition overhead compared to decomposing a sin-
gle image and accelerates the entire evaluation process. Moreover,
considering images in batches helps to better capture the pattern
of perturbations from multiple images. However, the choice of the
right batch size is important. A large batch of images needs larger
ranks for decomposition and could get very slow. Also, in a large
batch of images, the variety of images which are from different
classes increases which deteriorates the performance of the decom-
position. To find the best batch size, we perform a grid search on
values 5, 10, 20, and 50. Tensor Train decomposition of a 4-mode
tensor requires setting 3 values for the ranks. The first value corre-
sponds to compressing the batches, the second value corresponds
to compressing the image pixels, and the third value corresponds to
compressing the RGB channels. We fix the first rank to the number
1https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
2https://github.com/tensorly/tensorly
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(a) Accuracy
(b) Runtime
Figure 4: Accuracy and runtime of ResNet-v2 50 over 1000 images
attacked by FGSM (ϵ = 4). Tensor-Train decomposition is applied
on a single image (batch size 1) or 4-mode tensor of batches of size
5, 10, 20, and 50 to defend against FGSM perturbations.
of batches and the third rank to the number of channels i.e. 3. For
the second rank, we search within range 40 to 150. Figure 4 shows
the accuracy and runtime of the model for different batch sizes
for Tensor-Train decomposition with ranks ranging from 50 to 120
with steps of 5. The figure also shows how processing single images
(batch size 1) differs from batch sizes greater than 5. In the case
that we are processing single images, the runtime increases as the
rank gets larger, however, as the batch size increase, the runtime
becomes less sensitive to the ranks and for the batch size 50 it will
become almost constant for all the ranks. Batch size 5 produces
the highest accuracy, while batch size 10 has the lowest runtime.
There is a trade-off between runtime and accuracy. Based on the
priorities of the system, one might sacrifice accuracy for speed.
Figure 5 shows the effect of different batch sizes on the 3-mode-
stacked representation. Plots for batch sizes 5, 10, and 20 are almost
identical in both accuracy and runtime. Batch size 50 produces the
highest accuracy with the 3-mode-stacked representation. However,
the highest accuracy with 3-mode-stacked representation is lower
than the highest accuracy achieved using the 4-mode representa-
tion.
(a) Accuracy
(b) Runtime
Figure 5: Accuracy and runtime of ResNet-v2 50 over 1000 images
attacked by FGSM (ϵ = 4). Tensor-Train decomposition is applied
on a single image (batch size 1) or 3-mode-stacked tensor of batches
of size 5, 10, 20, and 50 to defend against FGSM perturbations.
4.3 Results
As mentioned in Section 3, Tensor-Train performs much faster
than Parafac and Tucker. Therefore, for the Parafac and Tucker,
we only report the result for the configuration which corresponds
to the maximum accuracy, as a reference for comparison against
Tensor-Train. Table 1 shows the result.
As illustrated in Table 1, Tensor-Train outperforms Tucker and
Parafac with respect to both accuracy and runtime. Tensor-Train
performed on 4-mode tensor has produces the highest accuracy.
As explained earlier, processing images in batches better captures
latent components corresponding to perturbation by leveraging
higher-order correlations. Tensor-Train can be utilized with differ-
ent tensor representations (3-mode, 3-mode-stacked, or 4-mode)
to adjust to needs for higher accuracy or higher speed. While the
4-mode representation produces the highest accuracy, the 3-mode
single image representation can be used to speed up the process,
with small drop in the accuracy. SLQ is the fastest among all de-
fenses, but it has the lowest accuracy.
4
Configurations PGD FGSM i-FGSM Runtime
(ϵ = 4) (ϵ = 4) (ϵ = 4) (seconds)
No defense 11.10 18.40 7.49
[Tensor-Train, 4-mode, 5, [5,90,3]] 51.53 43.59 50.46 675
[Tensor-Train, 4-mode, 10, [10,100,3]] 51.01 43.10 49.95 605
[Tensor-Train, 3-mode, 1, 40] 49.75 42.32 48.52 530
[Tucker, 3-mode-stacked, 30, [105,105,90]] 49.37 40.07 48.79 1050
[Parafac, 3-mode, 1, 60] 48.11 41.38 49.75 5500
SLQ 44.60 29.40 38.60 410
Table 1: Summary of accuracies and runtime of ResNet-v2 50 on ImageNet validation set against FGSM, i-FGSM, and PGD adversarial attacks
for defenses with different configurations.
4.4 Introducing Randomness to the Defense
Framework
Incorporating some randomness in the defense framework has
makes the job of the attacker more difficult to deal with a random
strategy rather than a fixed one. By selecting randomly from a
set of ranks, we can add randomness to the tensor decomposition
process. Another way is to split image into small patches, similar
to local 8 × 8 patches from Shield, and perform decomposition of
random rank on each patch and stitch up the patches to reconstruct
a randomized low-rank approximation of images. In a 4-mode ten-
sor representation, splitting images into patches creates smaller
4-mode tensors, e.g. splitting a 4-mode tensor including 5 batches of
images with size 300 × 300 × 3 into patches of size 50 × 50 creates 6
tensors of size 5, 50, 50, 3. Table 2 shows the results of incorporating
randomness with tensor decomposition.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we explored to what extent low-rank tensor decompo-
sition of perturbed images during the preprocessing step helps to
defend against adversarial attacks. The low-rank approximation of
the perturbed image is then fed to the deep network for the task of
classification. We evaluated our method against popular adversarial
attacks: FGSM, I-FGSM, and PGD. We illustrated that considering
Patch size Ranks Accuracy Runtime (seconds)
[5,10,3]
[50,50] [5,20,3] 48.35 1100
[5,30,3]
[5,70,3]
[5,40,3]
[150,150] [5,50,3] 50.96 765
[5,60,3]
[5,70,3]
No patching [5,90,3] 50.48 710
[5,110,3]
Table 2: Accuracies and runtime of ResNet-v2 50 on ImageNet val-
idation set against PGD adversarial attacks with ϵ = 4 vaccinated
using Tensor-Train with 4-mode tensor of batch size 5. Decompo-
sition rank is randomly selected from a set of possible ranks. No
patching is equivalent to full size image.
images in small batches better captures the latent structure of per-
turbations and helps to improve the performance of the model. We
also showed that how different configurations allow to trade-off
between accuracy and runtime.
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